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same need to provide invaluable in-
sights and brief analysis over a given 
country or a cross-cutting issue cur-
rently at stake. More than ever we strive 
now to raise awareness, provide close 
examinations and dissemination of all 
that. To this end we keep focussing on 
international crisis, on those countries 
suffering emergency situations, on the 
present challenges international field 
operations are facing,  on country poli-
cies and on their political life, civil so-
ciety aspirations and criticalities. Our 
interests reflect our areas of expertise: 
international politics and democrati-
sation processes, conflict prevention 
and crisis management, human rights 
issues and development cooperation 
aspects. We chose to adopt a popular 
yet rigorous approach to these themes, 
in the form of short articles, of no more 
than 2000 words each. 
We applied for and were granted an 
ISSN - International Standard Serial 
Number - a code that identifies our 
on-line publication unequivocally and 
specifically. For searching and quot-
ing purposes, as well as for repository 
storing it represents a first unavoid-
able step.
Our contributors are to be found 
among scholars as well as practition-
ers, consultants and PhD candidates, 
journalists and researchers, IOs and 
NGOs personnel. We aim at provid-
ing a multi-faced and comprehensive 
analysis approach that boasts inter-
national and western perspectives as 
well as the invaluable local and field 
points of view. We do hope very much 
that among our readers we will find 
additional authors interested in con-
tributing to future issues of our Com-
mentary. Next edition is expected to be 
finalised by the end of November 2011.
The ITPCM International Commentary is 
meant to be an open space for knowl-
edge sharing and advocacy, especially 
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Director and Scientific Supervision: 
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Editor: 
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Designer: 
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for those profiles more field and prac-
tically oriented. An opportunity to 
draw attention and information to less 
debated or often overlooked issues be-
yond the mere political, social or inter-
national column.
The last part of our publication will 
continue to  provide our readers with 
regualr updates of the core set of activ-
ities, trainings and researching initia-
tives undertaken at the ITPCM, whose 
aim is to address those same issues in a 
more concrete and operative way. Our 
website, however, remains the refer-
ence and more complete source of in-
formation in this regard.
Dear friends of the ITCPM and dear 
readers, welcome then to the ITPCM 
International Commentary and to this 
important issues devoted to an ex-
tremely relevant theatre nowadays: 
Pakistan.
Enjoy your reading!
Our warmest regards and best wishes 
for what we hope to be a peaceful and 
recovering summer break.
www.itpcm.sssup.it
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In the beginning it was Pakstan. By 
which Choudhary Rahmat Ali, in 
1932, while riding on the top of a Lon-
don bus, first gave name to his future 
country. He meant, in a new acronym, 
the five Northern units of India: Pun-
jab, North-West Frontier Province (still 
known as Afghan Province), Kashmir, 
Sind and Baluchistan. All those areas, 
in other words, that hosted the major-
ity of the northern Muslim population 
of British India back then.
Over time and for linguistic reasons an 
‘i’ was added between ‘Pak’ and
‘stan’ to ease pronunciation: Pakistan.
Since its independence, on 14 August 
1947, Pakistan has experienced peri-
ods of military rule, civil war, political 
instability and conflicts with neigh-
bouring India. As usual in history, a 
dense series of events, developments 
and turning points shaped and mould-
ed the state we all know nowadays. A 
federal parliamentary republic, with 
Islam as the state religion, consisting 
of four provinces and four federal ter-
ritories. 
With over 170 million people, it is the 
sixth most populous country in the 
world and has the second largest Mus-
lim population after Indonesia. The 
majority of them are Sunni; yet the 
country hosts the second-largest Shi’a 
community after Iran.
Pakistan holds more records. It has the 
seventh largest standing armed force 
and is the only Muslim-majority na-
tion to possess nuclear weapons. Michele Gonnelli
The power of numbers today is un-
questioned. But can we really rely 
upon those data and rankings to de-
scribe and grasp nature, role and criti-
calities of such a big country without 
prejudice?
Pakistan today is also the over 35,000 
citizens and 3,500 security person-
nel left dead by the war on terror, ac-
cording to a recently released survey 
conducted by the Associated Press of 
Pakistan.
While we write (July 2011) the Taliban 
released a footage appearing to show 
the execution-style killing of 16 police-
men in the tribal north-west part of the 
country.
Reality is much more multi-faceted 
and complex than we tend to repre-
sent it. It is bearing this in mind that 
we made an attempt in that direc-
tion, trying to avoid approximations. 
All contributors to this issue are to be 
praised for their effort and the intrinsic 
value of their specific input, opinion or 
point of view, which is only their own. 
They accepted to contribute freely and 
on a voluntary basis. A special thanks 
goes to Silvia Valentini that helped me 
to find and contact part of them. 
We hope to have enriched the palette 
by which the country is usually de-
picted. And to have made it closer and 
more intelligible to our readers.
Intro
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KILLING 
OSAMA BIN LADEN: 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
Pakistan North Mountains series. Photo courtesy 
of Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
by Emanuele Sommario
Assistant Professor of International Law, 
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Italy
The military operation that resulted in 
the killing of Osama Bin Laden in early 
May this year spawned a very lively 
debate not only within the general 
public but also among international 
law pundits. Reactions also came from 
a number of institutional actors some 
of which expressed unease towards 
the operation. Two UN Special 
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Rapporteurs issued a joint statement 
asking the Obama administration to 
shed some light on the facts in order 
to allow an assessment of the legality 
of the attack. Distinguished law 
professors have labelled the incident 
as a case of murder or as an instance 
of “extrajudicial killing without due 
process of the law”.
US and Pakistani authorities have not 
yet provided a sufficiently accurate 
factual account of the incident and 
it is perhaps premature to venture 
an opinion on its legality under 
international law. Nonetheless, it 
might be interesting to briefly examine 
the episode from a legal perspective 
as it implicates a number of important 
legal and political issues. 
We will focus our attention on the 
two main problematic aspects raised 
by the incident: a) did the US have a 
right to carry out such an operation 
on the territory of Pakistan? This 
question will have to be answered on 
the basis of what is commonly known 
as the jus ad bellum, i.e. the treaty and 
customary rules which limit the use of 
armed force in international relations; 
b) was the operation conducted in 
the framework of an armed conflict? 
The legal qualification of the situation 
is crucial, as in times of war the 
intentional taking of life of individuals 
belonging to enemy armed forces is 
in many cases considered legal. In 
times of peace, on the other hand, the 
standards applicable are those of law 
enforcement operations, according 
to which deliberate killings are only 
allowed as extrema ratio in exceptional 
circumstances.
Could the US use force on Pakistani 
soil?
There is little question that in the 
presence of an authorization (or ex 
post acquiescence) by Pakistan, the 
US intervention should be considered 
legal from a jus ad bellum perspective. 
It appears that Pakistani authorities 
had no knowledge of the attack, yet 
it is unclear whether they had given 
a general consent for the US to carry 
out operations on their territory 
against terrorist suspects. Bin Laden 
definitely was a suspected criminal 
with multiple indictments issued 
against him by US courts. If the US 
had permission to apprehend him, 
attempting to do so would have 
been entirely legal. Yet the Pakistani 
PM, speaking to the Parliament a 
fe  days after the facts, expressed 
regret that the “unilateral action” was 
undertaken without the government’s 
concurrence. The Parliament itself 
condemned the US intervention as “a 
violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty” 
and the US ambassador to Islamabad 
was summoned for a protest about 
the incident.
Unsurprisingly, the US chose to base 
the legality of the operation not on 
Islamabad’s consent but rather on 
the argument that the killing was an 
act of self defence carried out against 
a lawful military target. US State 
Department Legal Adviser Harold 
Koh explained that his country was 
“in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
as well as the Taliban and associated 
forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 
attacks, and may use force consistent 
with its inherent right to self-defense 
under international law.” 
As is well known, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter recognizes the “inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations”. Once 
the existence of an armed attack is 
ascertained, the State suffering it has 
a right to respond forcefully while 
respecting the criteria of necessity, 
proportionality and immediacy.
Traditionally, the right to self-defence 
was deemed to arise in the context 
of inter-State attacks. It is rather 
controversial whether the notion of 
‘armed attack’ as contained in Article 
51 also encompasses attacks launched 
by non-State actors like Al Qaeda. 
Advocates of a more liberal reading 
of the provision argue that the letter 
of Article 51 does not designate 
States as the sole entities capable 
of launching an “armed attack”. In 
addition, they cite UNSC Resolutions 
1368 and 1373, adopted in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks, whose preambles 
explicitly recall  “the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence 
as recognized by the Charter of the 
United Nations”. 
Yet the operative paragraphs of the 
resolutions characterize the events as 
“terrorist attacks” rather than “armed 
attacks”. Indeed, Resolution 1368 calls 
on all States “to work together urgently 
to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors” of the 
attacks, hence suggesting that the 
apprehension and punishment of 
Bin Laden should be considered a 
matter of law enforcement rather 
than a jus ad bellum issue. Moreover, 
the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has recently reaffirmed a more 
conservative reading of the provision, 
arguing that attacks launched by non-
State actors can constitute “armed 
attacks” in the sense of the UN 
Charter only if they can be attributed 
to a State.1 Clearly, if one embraces the 
ICJ’s stance, the US could not claim to 
act in self-defence when intervening 
(without the host State’s consent) on 
Pakistani territory against Al Qaeda.
Assuming however that self-defence 
can be exercised against a terrorist 
organization operating from abroad, 
the issue of necessity would arise, 
which is closely connected to the 
preservation of the sovereignty of 
the State that is (it is presumed) 
unwillingly or unknowingly 
harbouring the terrorists. A case could 
be made that in such circumstances an 
armed intervention is really necessary 
only if the territorial State is given a 
chance to deal with them first but 
fails to do so.2 In such circumstances, 
the infringement of the local State’s 
sovereignty could be justified by its 
failure to prevent its territory from 
being used in a manner contrary to 
the rights of other States. In the case at 
hand, it appears that the US has made 
no attempt to involve the Pakistani 
authorities in the operation against 
Bin Laden. Rather, the Department 
of State seems to have made a 
determination that Islamabad was 
unwilling or unable to apprehend him, 
a surprising move if one considers 
that Pakistan has consistently been 
1     International Court of Justice, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004, at para. 139 and Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), Decision 
of 19 December 2005, at paras 146 and 160. Note 
that in both instances some of the judges dis-
sented from the majority’s restrictive reading of 
Article 51.
2     See for instance N. Lubell, Extraterri-
torial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors, OUP, 
2010, at 46.
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singled out as a key US ally in the so 
called “war on terror”.
What is the law applicable to the 
operation?
As highlighted above, the US 
maintains that it is involved in an 
armed conflict with Al Qaeda and 
that the legal regime governing 
the raid in Abbottabad is set out in 
positive and customary International 
Humanitarian Law. If this were the 
case, the deprivation of life would 
have to be assessed against the 
backdrop of the rules regulating the 
conduct of hostilities in war, which are 
obviously much more “permissive” 
than those operating in times of 
peace. In brief, during an armed 
conflict a member of the armed forces 
of one of the belligerent parties can be 
made the object of an attack (even a 
lethal one) at any time, just because he 
possesses that specific condition, and 
even if he does not represent a direct 
and imminent threat to the attacker. 
What matters is his particular status 
as a combatant, which permanently 
turns him into a legitimate military 
target, unless he is hors de combat.3 
3     According to Article 47 of Addi-
The same applies to a civilian taking 
direct part in hostilities, who loses 
the protection granted to him by IHL 
for the time of his participation in the 
conflict. According to the majority of 
scholars, in an armed conflict scenario 
there is no obligation to capture an 
enemy fighter instead of killing him, 
nor is there a legal duty to solicit his 
surrender. Hence, if we accept that 
Bin Laden was the leader of a guerrilla 
force engaged in an armed conflict 
with the US (and thus a combatant), 
and if he did not clearly express his 
intention to surrender to the SEALS, 
his killing must be seen as entirely 
legal. If, on the contrary, he had 
attempted to surrender and was shot 
nonetheless, the US troops’ conduct 
would amount to a war crime. 
But was there an armed conflict 
ongoing in Pakistan at the relevant 
time? IHL knows two categories 
of armed conflicts: International 
tional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions (1977), a person is hors de combat if: “(a) 
he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he 
clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or 
(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is oth-
erwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, 
and therefore is incapable of defending himself; 
provided that in any of these cases he abstains 
from any hostile act and does not attempt to es-
cape.”
Armed Conflicts (IAC) and Non-
International Armed Conflicts 
(NIACs), i.e. civil wars. According 
to Common Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions – which apply to IACs 
- their scope of application covers 
“all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties”. As only States 
can be Contracting Parties to the 
Conventions, it is safe to say that only 
conflicts involving two or more States 
can be qualified as IACs. Non-State 
actors such as Al Qaeda cannot be a 
part to an IAC. 
Is it then a NIAC?  Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions (covering 
conflicts “not of an international 
character”) says that such conflicts 
must occur “in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties”. 
Elaborating on this definition, the 
International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
defined NIACs as situations of 
“protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State”.4 If 
4     ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. 
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Pakistan North Mountains series. Photo courtesy 
of Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
hostilities currently unfolding in 
Afghanistan between the Taliban on 
one side and the Afghan armed forces 
supported by the US and other foreign 
contingents on the other, almost 
certainly fit this definition, the same 
can probably not be said regarding 
the situation in Pakistan on May 1st 
2011. Even though the US had in the 
past carried out military strikes on 
Pakistani territory against members of 
Al Qaeda  – mainly by means of drone 
attacks – it is doubtful whether these 
incidents taken together (including 
the operation in Abbottabad) would 
meet the intensity criteria of a NIAC. 
The “global war on terror” invoked 
by the US is not an “armed conflict” 
in the technical sense of the term. 
To use the words of an ICRC Legal 
Adviser: “The phrase ‘war on terror’ 
is a rhetorical device having no legal 
significance. There is no more logic to 
the automatic application of the laws 
of armed conflict to the ‘war on terror’ 
than there is to the ‘war on drugs’, 
‘war on poverty’ or ‘war on cancer.’”5 
If the situation does not qualify as 
an armed conflict, the right to life of 
individuals should still be protected 
under International Human Rights 
Law. Article 6(1) of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), for 
instance,  affirms that “no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” But is 
IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 
1995, at para.70
5     http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/misc/5xcmnj.htm. See also Interna-
tional Law Association, Hague Conference 2010, 
Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict 
in International Law, available at http://www.
ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/2176DC63-
D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87
the US bound by Human Rights treaties 
when acting outside its borders? The 
answer hinges on whether Bin Laden 
could be considered to be under US 
“jurisdiction” during the operation. 
Washington has consistently ruled 
out that the CCPR imposes human 
rights obligations outside American 
borders. The  United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, however, 
determined as early as 1981 that the 
notion of “jurisdiction” is not linked 
to the place where a violation takes 
place but rather “to the relationship 
between the individual and the State 
in relation to a violation of any of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant, 
wherever they occurred”.6
So – assuming the US was exercising 
“jurisdiction” under Human Rights 
Law – the better view is probably that 
the situation has to be assessed using 
the “law enforcement” paradigm, 
an exercise for which the UN “Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials” come in handy. The most 
important, for our purposes, is 
probably Principle N. 9 according 
to which “intentional lethal use of 
firearms may only be made when 
strictly unavoidable in order to protect 
life.” Hence the question becomes: 
did Bin Laden pose an imminent and 
serious threat to the lives of the SEALS 
or of any other innocent bystander? 
The White House has revealed he 
was unarmed and yet “he resisted US 
forces”.
The fact that he appeared to be 
6     Human Rights Committee, Lopez 
Burgos v. Uruguay, Application No. 52/1979, 29 
July 1981, at para 12.2.
unarmed is per se not conclusive. 
The US commandos might have 
reasonably believed that he could 
hide a gun or a hand grenade and 
that he was ready to use it. But if 
“unarmed” means that they were 
positive he did not carry a weapon 
and that no one was in arm’s reach, 
then the US would have to make the 
case that the “resistance” he put up 
was in itself life-threatening. 
Conclusion
It is understandable that a sizeable 
part of the international community 
and world public opinion seemed to 
be little concerned about Bin Laden’s 
fate. After all, he openly claimed 
responsibility for acts of terrorism 
amounting to crimes against 
humanity and has incited others to 
commit similar acts. But if there is one 
thing we should expect from States 
that act as heralds of human rights 
and the rule of law, it is that they give 
even to their fiercest enemies a human 
treatment. As a part of it, terrorists 
should be arrested and brought before 
a court of law. Their  guilt should be 
established by means of a trial that 
respects certain fundamental tenets 
and only after such a procedure can 
they be punished (even with death, if 
the national criminal code envisages 
such a penalty). However, every 
taking of life by a State outside the 
parameters outlined above constitutes 
an extrajudicial killing and represents 
a serious violation of international 
law. 
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IN PAKISTAN
by Iqbal Haider Butt
Youth expert and social development 
consultant based in Lahore – Pakistan.DEVOLUTION
With the dissolution of last tranche of 
seven ministries on 29th June, 2011, 
a total of seventeen erstwhile federal 
subjects have been transferred to the 
provinces under the 18th Amend-
ment to the constitution and the proc-
ess of provincial autonomy has been 
at least theoretically completed in 
Pakistan. In practice, however, this 
political decision has not been backed 
up by technical and financial plan-
ning and the provinces are unable 
to take responsibilities of dissolved 
federal subjects - mainly because they 
don’t have either resources or the staff 
Kabbadi Match in Derawar (Kabbaddi is an indigenous 
sport of Punjab). Photo courtesy of Rahat Dar, 
Pakistan, 2010
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to run ministries. The skeptics ar-
gue that the federal government has 
undertaken provincial autonomy as 
a fiscal measure to cut down its ex-
penditure and shift its burden upon 
the provinces. The pending issues be-
tween the federal and provincial gov-
ernments have created a governance 
vacuum that will especially hamper 
public functioning of the social devel-
opment sectors i.e. education, health,
women and youth affairs, etc. The 
Parliament enacted the historic 18th 
amendment April last year on the 
recommendations of Parliamentary 
Committee on Constitutional Reforms 
that consisted of 26 representatives of 
alle lected political parties.
Another Implementation Commis-
sion of members from ruling and 
opposition parties later thrashed out 
details of the amendment through 68 
formal and informal meetings and 
executed the 18th amendment by dis-
solving 17 ministries in three tranches: 
Dec 2010, April 2011 and June 2011.
After its formal implementation, the 
federal government at least on papers 
has now powers over only five sub-
jects - finance, defence, foreign affairs, 
communications and revenue. Giv-
en the unprecedented nature of the 
new constitutional development, the 
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani 
announced to commemorate July 1 as 
the national day of provincial auton-
omy. The spirit of 18th amendment is 
rooted in the original constitution of 
1973, which was adopted unanimous-
ly by the sitting and opposition par-
ties and later abrogated by the martial 
law government in 1977. At that time 
there were three lists of subjects made 
within the constitution:
(i) federal list, (ii) provincial list, and 
(iii) the concurrent list that included 
all those subjects that were to be joint-
ly taken care of by the federal and 
provincial governments. The concur-
rent list comprised of 47 different sub-
ject matters.
The founders of the 1973 constitution 
had reached an understanding that 
the concurrent list will be removed 
from the constitution ten years after 
its promulgation. That did not hap-
pen due to imposition of Martial law 
in the country. The government of 
General Zia preferred to run Pakistan 
as usual – from a strong centre in its 
capital Islamabad.
When implemented in its letter and 
spirit, the 18th amendment would 
have profound impact on the way the 
country is governed and with prom-
ised powers and funds, the provinces 
ill com and political authority over 
public matters in Pakistan.
Federalism and Provincial Autono-
my in a Diverse Country 
Pakistan’s problematic relationship 
with federalism and provincial auton-
omy dates back to its formative phase 
when its founding father Muham-
mad Ali Jinnah, popularly known 
as Quaid- Azam (The Great Leader), 
advocated greater political autonomy 
in the framework of the United India 
against the strong centralized tenden-
cies of the Indian National Congress. 
Having frustrated in getting greater 
autonomy for Muslim majority prov-
inces, he opted for independence of 
the country on 14 August 1947. After 
his early death, the strong bureaucrat-
ic set-up of the
colonial institutions could command 
authority over the new state in the 
absence of strong political parties and 
the leadership like the Leader himself 
could offer. Nevertheless, in theory, 
all three constitutions of Pakistan 
(1956, 1962 and 1973) have adhered to 
the principles of federalism.
This dichotomy in theory and prac-
tice has long persisted in the consti-
tutional and political development of 
the country.
In Pakistan’s multi-ethnic milieu the 
abolishment of the centralized rule 
over provincial autonomy comes 
along successive periods of constitu-
tional and political struggle against
hegemony of the federal govern-
ments. The ethnic diversity of Pakistan 
is composed of 59.1 percent Punjabis. 
Others are 13.8 percent Pakhtuns, 12.1 
percent Sindhis. 7.7 percent muhajirs 
(Urdu-speaking migrants from Up-
per and Central India), 4.3 percent 
Balochs, and 3 percent members of 
other ethnic groups. The sub-national 
complexity is compounded by pre-
dominance of Punjabis in the Pakistan 
Army, who have been traditionally the 
main recruiting nursery even for the 
colonial forces before the independ-
ence of the country. According to the 
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 
the public relations arms of the forces, 
the Punjabis made 71 percent of the 
army in 2001. Their number is gradu-
ally decreasing after former President 
General Musharraf introduced a new 
recruiting policy to induct less repre-
sented ethnicities into the army. By 
2007 the Punjabi number had fallen 
to 57 percent and was planned at 54 
percent by 2011.
Due to strong Army links and long 
military regimes the nationalists 
of the smaller provinces have been 
equating Punjab as the envoy of cen-
tralized rule in Pakistan – the succes-
sor of colonial masters. Muhajir-dom-
inant bureaucracy, especially in the 
earlier decades of Pakistan, was also 
held responsible for denying rights 
of the lesser developed ethnicities. 
The state policy of pursuing one na-
tion, one language and denial of po-
litical autonomy was thus regarded 
as beneficial to the relatively affluent 
ethnicities.
The country’s disintegration (1971) 
after a military action by the state 
in 1969 is often attributed to the na-
tionalist resistance and failure of the 
federal government to accommodate 
provincial autonomy. One of its units 
the East Pakistan had rebelled against 
hegemony of the centralized rule sub-
sequently incubating a new country, 
Bangladesh. The nationalist senti-
ments in the similar Eastern Unit had 
accentuated as back as 1952 on the 
questions of the status of Bengali lan-
guage as the lingua franc and removal 
of popularly elected government of 
Jugtu Front, a coalition of East Paki-
stani opposition parties, in 1954.
The centre also deposed elected gov-
ernment of Balochistan province 
compelling another to resign in North 
West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 
1973. That resulted in military action 
in Balochistan.
The centre is also accused of instigat-
ing small scale insurgency in Balo-
chistan province that heightened after 
murder of a nationalist leader Nawab 
Akbar Bugti in 2006. Nawab Bugti 
was former chief minister of the prov-
ince. After his death the occurrences 
of human rights abuses by the state 
security forces, ethnicity based kill-
ings of Punjabis and inter-ethnic ten-
sions have increased.
The case of national census also signi-
fies inter-provincial and inter-ethnic 
relations in Pakistan.
The census scheduled in 1991 was 
conducted in 1998 and the next one 
ISSN. 2239-7949July 2011ITPCM International Commentary
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due in 2001 have not been completed 
so far. This delay is attributed to in-
ter-ethic tensions and accusation of 
nationalist political leadership of es-
pecially within Sindh and Balochistan 
provinces against others for trying 
to fudge data of the census to show 
higher number of people of certain 
ethnicities.
It was this context of mistrust that 
the provinces could not reach to a 
resource allocation formula among 
themselves. Since the provinces have 
been largely dependent upon federal 
financial transfers in Pakistan, the dis-
tribution of resources are decided on 
the basis of National Finance Commis-
sion (NFC) Awards. The federal gov-
ernments are constitutionally bound 
to implement NFC Awards every five 
years. However, there have been only 
four conclusive NFC Awards (1974, 
1991, 1997 and 2009-10) and one presi-
dential distribution order (2006). The 
delay in implementation has been 
due to lack of reaching to consensus 
on the resource distribution.
The latest (seventh) NFC Award 
(2010) is a landmark achievement of 
the present democratic government. 
It is the first time after secession of 
East Pakistan that the distribution of 
resources among provinces is based 
not only on population but also on 
other factors like backwardness, in-
verse population density and revenue 
collection/generation. Additionally, 
the provinces were allocated 56 per-
cent of the net divisible pool in the 
first year (2010-11) and 57.5 percent 
during the remaining period of the 
Award.
The present NFC award is an effort to 
appease smaller provinces, which was 
duly accepted by the biggest province 
Punjab. Moreover, a special package 
for the Balochistan province (biggest
in land, smallest in population) was 
introduced in 2010 by the federal gov-
ernment under the name of Aghaz-
i-Haqooq Balochistan “Begginng of 
the Rights of Balochistan”. Under this 
package and the NFC Awards, Balo-
chistan would be paid 120 billion ru-
pees on account of royalty of its Gas 
Resources in equal installments of Rs 
12 billion for ten years.
The Current Debate: 
Political vs. Fiscal Autonomy
The due jubilation and political 
rhetoric apart, the announcement of 
provincial autonomy is still in dol-
drums. Whereas the political process 
to dissolve the concurrent list and 
Wall chalking in favour of demands for a new 
province HAZARA - presently part of the Khyber 
Pukhtunkhawa (KPK) province. Photo courtesy of 
Rahat Dar, Pakistan, 2011
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17 subjects has been completed, the 
technical input for making this shift is 
blurred and massive work has to be
done for smooth functioning under 
the provinces. At this point it is ap-
prehended that not responding with 
immediate actions would cause un-
precedented damage to macro-level 
national development in Pakistan. 
Some of the key concerns are:
i. The Future of National Policies and 
Institutional Governance: After years 
long input, the country was able to 
formulate national policies in sectors 
like education, youth affairs, labour, 
population in 2009 and 2010. It had 
taken 22 years, for example, to devise 
the national framework for youth de-
velopment for the first time in Paki-
stan in 2009. After devolution of these 
ministries, the future of the national 
policies and commitments is in limbo. 
The provinces need to act urgently to 
reach to a consensus and adopt ap-
propriate policy framework in their 
jurisdiction, which is missing at this 
juncture. It is feared that in absence 
of such frameworks the national and 
international commitments may go 
stray with massive over-lapping and 
lack of a national direction.
In education sector only, the introduc-
tion of constitutional clause 25-A will 
go unresponded.
Under this radical clause the state has 
been bound to mandatorily provide 
free and quality education to all eligi-
ble children from 5 to 16 years. After 
the dissolution this right to education 
is apprehended to be violated and a 
fundamental right to be denied to the
citizens.
The institutional confusion was best 
witnessed during months’ long pub-
lic controversy over the fate of Higher 
Education Commission (HEC). The 
federal government in April 2011 an-
nounced to disband the HEC. Activ-
ists from almost every sphere of life 
and the Vice Chancellors, academics 
and students came out to the streets 
and government had to withdraw its 
decision.
ii. Funding and Resource Allocation 
Issues: No costing has been done to 
implement the provincial autonomy. 
No one knows what the cost of pro-
vincial autonomy is and who will 
bear it? [In a briefing prepared by the 
finance division of the Balochistan 
province during a policy dialogue or-
ganized by a youth development or-
ganization BARGAD, it was told that
the expenditure roughly amounted to 
100 billion rupees in capital terms]. It 
is also still unclear how the provinc-
es will fund on-going development 
projects initiated under the Public Sec-
tor Development Programme (PSDP). 
What are the liabilities and assets to 
be distributed among provinces and 
the centre? In the first federal budget 
after the 18th amendment there are 
zero funds available in 16 dissolved 
subjects and in comparison to 2010-11 
budget, the federal government has 
withheld allocation of worth 41.166 
billion rupees. This is easily deducted 
that there can be no action taken be-
fore costing and fixing this funding 
and assets issue.
iii. Staffing, Structures and Capacity 
Issues of Provinces: The provinces 
lack matching structures, staff and 
capacity to run many dissolved min-
istries.
That means that practically the pro-
vincial set-ups cannot handle many 
social development issues properly 
on their own and would act on dis-
cretion of the personal approaches of 
respective chief ministers of the prov-
inces. The new institutional mecha-
nism will have to be established from 
the scratch and a route map for build-
ing capacity of the responsible offi-
cials will have to be developed. The 
provinces attach this issue also to fi-
nancial resources.
Furthermore, the issues of national 
regulation and standardization and 
Inter-province coordination have to 
be resolved.
The die-hard proponents of the 18th 
amendment and provincial autono-
my argue that the haste to introduce 
the reforms was inevitable to appease 
sense of deprivation in smaller prov-
inces especially Balochistan. That’s 
why the proper planning was skipped 
during the introduction of the 18th 
amendment.
One of the decent methods was to de-
clare a transitory phase of 2 to 3 years 
for policy clarity and financial plan-
ning and gradually implement the 
provincial autonomy; so that stake-
holders especially the provinces were 
able to duly take responsibility of the 
dissolved subjects.
This lack of planning also speaks of 
how planning and research work is 
neglected in countries like Pakistan, 
where the reforms introducers imple-
ment first on political impulses and 
think only afterwards. It is ironical 
that the constitutional reforms com-
mission still thinks the pending issues 
as “implementation” problem and 
not the design faults.
The process of the devolution also 
exposes weak and elitist political par-
ties that may have been very stubborn 
and vocal for provincial autonomy, 
during the last six decades. But when 
it comes to actual work, they have no 
home work nor proposals available, 
for fiscal autonomy of the provinces, 
beyond principles and rhetoric. For 
that may be the political parties will 
have to sacrifice more space within 
their ranks to professionals.
Wall chalking in favour of demands for a new 
province HAZARA - presently part of the Khyber 
Pukhtunkhawa (KPK) province. Photo courtesy of 
Rahat Dar, Pakistan, 2011
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First they came for the communists,
and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a 
communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t a 
trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn’t speak out because I wasn’t 
a Jew.
Then they came for me
and there was no one left to speak out 
for me.
Martin Niemöller 
The postcolonial state of Pakistan, ini-
tially demanded because of the fear 
of the majoritarian oppression in a 
unified India, became a majoritarian 
state, almost immediately after its cre-
ation. It is important to point out here 
that majoritarianism does not signify 
democracy. Before two years of Paki-
stan’s ‘independence’ were complete 
PAKISTAN:
FRIEND OR ENEMY OF
Islamabad at night fall. Photo courtesy of Saeed Ur 
Rehman, Pakistan, 2010.
THE “FREE WORLD„?
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(in March 1949), the state of Pakistan 
began the process of determining the 
objectives of its future constitution 
called Objectives Resolution. It was a 
move fraught with paradoxes: mem-
bers of the Constituent Assembly 
were asked by Liaqat Ali Khan, the 
Prime Minister, to vote on things gen-
erally believed to be beyond the realm 
of democracy which is a worldly way 
of governing the affairs of human 
subjects. The first sentence of Objec-
tives Resolution was: “sovereignty 
over the entire universe belongs to 
God Almighty alone and the authori-
ty which He has delegated to the state 
of Pakistan through its people.” 1
It was paradoxical because Liaqat Ali 
Khan, a Prime Minister, wanted the 
members of the Constituent Assembly 
to vote whether God Almighty had 
sovereignty over the entire universe 
or not. When the minority members 
of the Constituent Assembly objected 
to the metaphysical and communal 
nature of the contents of the resolu-
tion, it was because the state of Pa-
kistan was attempting an ambiguous 
way of relating with the citizens. This 
way of dealing with the citizens was 
against the idea of the modern state 
and the nature of the state-citizen 
contract. The justification of the state’s 
right to govern the lives of individu-
als is derived from the state’s ability to 
abolish the natural condition of bellum 
omnium contra omnes, the war of all 
against all2.  But the state of Pakistan 
employed the concept of sovereignty 
against the idea of universal citizen-
ship when it sought to define its con-
stitutional objectives. 
In other words, the state was declar-
ing monotheistic citizens as ideal 
citizens and, despite their equal citi-
zenship, polytheistic citizens were 
rendered enemies of the state because 
the state had declared the faith of the 
majority as its source of sovereignty. 
1    Hamid Khan. Constitutional and Po-
litical History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 2009. p. 57
2    Thomas Hobbes. On the Citizen (Cam-
bridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). 
Trans. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1998. p. 30; Friedrich Ni-
etzsche. “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Mor-
al Sense.” Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books. 1982. p. 
44.
The minority citizens became non-
participatory citizens because the 
source of political power existed in 
the realm of metaphysics only accessi-
ble to the majority. By adding an extra 
source of conflict, the state failed in its 
promise to abolish the state of nature 
and created a new reason for conflict. 
The state of Pakistan declared war on 
some of its own citizens by enunciat-
ing exclusionary, instead of universal, 
sources of legitimacy and political 
power. Citizenship and representa-
tion were no longer enough. The 
non-monotheistic citizen had to face 
another hierarchy which did not ex-
ist before the state’s declaration of its 
own objectives. 
This was the start: the ordinary citi-
zens had to embrace the clichés and 
the state was afraid of all things In-
dian in the region and Soviet in the 
world. Soon Pakistan was forging and 
solidifying alliances with neo-colonial 
America, Pahlavi Iran, and other anti-
Soviet countries or, one can say, the 
neo-colonial empire was facilitating 
these alliances. In a document declas-
sified in 2001, after 50 years, reveals 
that the USA was planning to use 
Islam as a friendly tool of the “free 
world” for its cultural and defence 
against the spread of communism as 
early as 19513.
In the meanwhile, Pakistan was ready 
to do anything as long as it produced 
enough surplus weaponry and fi-
nances to thwart the imagined and 
real threats coming from India. For 
its anti-India foreign policy, Pakistan 
lent its services to whoever was will-
ing to hire the state. The citizens of 
Pakistan and their opinions did not 
matter. The state had become a merce-
nary state that was willing to profit by 
any means available as long as there 
was enough surplus to deal with In-
dia. The not-so-covert war against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and al-
liance with the USA, was mostly for 
the profitmaking of the military and 
bureaucratic elite and was detrimen-
tal to the interests of religious and 
sectarian minorities and non-Muslim 
citizens of Pakistan.
3    Enclosure to Dacca Despatch No. 
13, August 7, 1951; Declassified on October 27, 
2001.
What had begun as a majoritarian 
policy, in the guise of democracy, took 
fascist overtones by the time Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto had banned alcohol and 
declared the Ahmedis as non-Mus-
lims. After Bhutto, Zia ul Haq turned 
almost all the state machinery into in-
struments of hyper-Islamization. And 
placed Pakistan’s civic identity and 
the public sphere under siege. The 
police had started harassing anyone 
pre-martial hetero-normativity. What 
was normal in the “free world” was 
abnormal in the state which was busy 
protecting the “free world” against 
the possible onslaught of commu-
nism and the policy of creating cul-
tural bulwarks through Islamization 
had resulted in Saudisation and Wa-
habisation and those whose collective 
name was used to justify all this, the 
citizens, are still “reaping the whirl-
wind.”
After the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, those who had practiced guerrilla 
warfare with American and Israeli 
weapons assumed that they were ca-
pable of blessing the world by impos-
ing their Wahabist and anti-people 
reading of Islam on the entire world. 
They were willing to ignore the ab-
sence of the military-industrial com-
plex that sustains long-term overt and 
covert wars. They were willing to di-
vide the world into the house of peace 
(where Muslims live) and the house 
of war (where infidels live). Their al-
liances with the states that sponsored 
them were purely strategic. If the 
state of Pakistan supports them, it is 
a virtuous state otherwise they were 
ready to declare the entire state ma-
chinery non-Muslim and a legitimate 
target of guerrilla/jihadist operations. 
The so-called “free world” tried to 
forget the problem by not having 
any post-Afghan-Jihad strategy for 
co-opting the informal war machines 
it had unleashed on the region. The 
moment the USSR disappeared, the 
magnanimity of democratic countries 
also disappeared. A Pakistani general 
described the situation to Tariq Ali 
thus: “Pakistan was the condom that 
the Americans needed to enter Af-
ghanistan. We’ve served our purpose 
and they think we can be just flushed 
down the toilet.”4 
4    David Barsamian. Louder than Bombs: 
Interviews from the Progressive Magazine. Cam-
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In the absence of a formal structure 
based on revenue-extraction and the 
social contract, the state tried to mo-
nopolize informal violence in vain 
after promoting it for over a decade 
in Afghanistan and it failed. Now 
the state of Pakistan is facing what it 
tried to impose on others at its incep-
tion. When sovereignty was assigned 
in Allah through a vote of 21 to 10 in 
1949, a large number of non-Muslim 
citizens were minority citizens were 
disenfranchised and were stopped 
from heading the state (the Census of 
Pakistan in 1951 recorded 22% of the 
total population as Hindu in East Pa-
kistan alone). Now the Islamists are 
bridge, MA: South End Press. 2004. p. 42.
declaring the state of Pakistan as a 
client state of America and declaring 
it non-Islamic and therefore a valid 
target of jihad. The state of Pakistan 
has become an unwitting victim of its 
own policies. It is feeling as vulner-
able as its minorities have always felt. 
Pakistan, since its inception, has been 
ideologically divided between be-
coming a security state and an eco-
nomic state as if national security 
were something separate from the 
food security, social security, eco-
nomic security and human security of 
the people. Now there is no econom-
ic security and both the citizen and 
the state are equally vulnerable. The 
state is selling its skills to the high-
est international bidders: the skill of 
creating insecurity anywhere needed, 
be it Afghanistan or India. In the last 
63 years, the state lost 147,570 square 
kilometres of its territory because 
of its neglect of Bengali citizens and 
they successfully declared independ-
ence and created Bangladesh. Now 
the Balochistan province is simmer-
ing in a similar way and the future of 
the province is uncertain. Emergency 
is the sole arbiter of Pakistan’s inter-
national relations and also the most 
profitable export now.
Islamabad at the crack of dawn. Photo courtesy of 
Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2010.
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PAKISTANI 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
IS AWAKENING? 
The current wave of political unrest 
in the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region enables us to throw 
light on some crucial questions re-
garding the relationship between 
democracy and authoritarianism in 
the Muslim world. We would argue 
that the changes going on in the Arab 
world may be the signal of a more gen-
eral process that may interest Muslim 
societies. The crucial elements of this 
process include the emergence of the 
A priviledged viewpoint. Photo courtesy of Saeed 
Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2008.
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middle class, the new political activi-
ties of the younger generations, and 
the apparent crisis of the mainstream 
opposition parties. 
In this context, Pakistan seems to be 
a useful case for comparison.  From 
a historical point of view, Pakistan 
may be viewed as a Janus-faced soci-
ety, looking simultaneously towards 
the Middle East and South Asia. In-
deed, Pakistani history in itself can be 
viewed as the result of two different 
pressures, one towards greater iden-
tification with the Central Islamic 
lands, and the other towards South 
Asian culture. From the ethnic and 
religious points of view, the lands 
that constitute nowadays Pakistan 
have strong ties with the central Is-
lamic lands. Let us remember that 
the region has been Islamized mainly 
by populations coming from Central 
Asia, and that many Pakistani fami-
lies today are proud of their Turkish, 
Mogul or Arabic names. For centu-
ries, in the highly hierarchical South 
Asian Muslim society, being of West-
ern Asian or Middle Eastern origin 
has been a guarantee of noble (ashraf) 
status. Other important connections 
have been established over the centu-
ries through the networks of scholars 
and holy men that have travelled from 
the central Islamic lands, the Arabian 
peninsula and Central Asia, to the 
Indian subcontinent. For the shi’as of 
Pakistan, in particular, since the 16th 
century, there have been strong links 
with Iran. The movement for the es-
tablishment of Pakistan in the 1940s 
has perhaps even strengthened the 
Middle Eastern bonds, with its em-
phasis on Islam as the basic symbol of 
the Pakistan movement. 
Obviously Pakistan is also part of the 
South Asian cultural milieu. Setting 
aside the linguistic bonds (Hindu-Ur-
du), the models of popular religious 
devotion that are central in local Islam 
bear strong links with the South Asian 
religious environment. Let us look 
also at the political system. Unlike 
the Middle East, Pakistan has never 
aligned itself to the “one-party sys-
tem” group of states. On the contrary, 
its political system is fully akin to the 
South Asian tradition of multi-party 
system, be it in the “dominant party” 
or “bi-polar” variants. For most of 
its democratic history, Pakistan has 
been characterized by a tendency to 
endlessly create and redefine politi-
cal organizations. This rich political 
party history resulted in a typical 
intra-party factionalism and fragmen-
tation along personal and charismatic 
lines. Another very important differ-
ence between Pakistan and the Arab 
scenario is that, despite the frequent 
attempts of both civilian and military 
governments to influence the elec-
tions results, Pakistani polls have gen-
erally been acknowledged for being 
substantially reliable. Moreover, since 
its birth in 1947, Pakistan has had a 
history of mass political participa-
tion, and of popular political passion; 
something that has its roots in the co-
lonial devolution of power. All of this 
obviously depicts a sharp difference 
from the state-controlled political sys-
tems of most Arab states, as in Egypt 
or Tunisia, where elections were uni-
versally recognized as manipulated 
by the regimes in power.
This notwithstanding, Pakistan’s 
overall political performances in the 
last sixty years bears many similarities 
with the Arab scene. Like most of the 
latter, Pakistan has often been depict-
ed as a “failed state” for its consistent 
failure in establishing a stable democ-
racy. The country has seen military 
governments for almost half of its life, 
and most important, during “demo-
cratic” regimes the elected politicians 
have generally served their role in a 
very similar way to the “neo-patrimo-
nial” governments of the MENA re-
gion. Since the 1970s, with the return 
to “democracy” after twelve years of 
military rule, the central role played 
by patron/client relations and ethnic/
family connections in the running of 
central and provincial institutions, 
has been the rule in Pakistan. At the 
same time, the other state institutions, 
as the judiciary and Parliament, have 
not been able until very recently to ex-
ercise control on those holding power 
at the center.
Given the similarity between the two 
cases, it is tempting to make a com-
parison between the current wave of 
protests in the Arab countries, and 
the massive public demonstrations 
that have marked the last two years 
of the Musharraf regime, from 2007 
to 2008. As it is widely known, dur-
ing the latter period of the Mushar-
raf government, the opposition grew 
steadily, overcoming the mainstream 
MRD (movement for the restoration 
of democracy), and becoming a popu-
lar wave of protests. In particular, the 
opposition against the regime intensi-
fied after Musharraf’s attempts to put 
the Supreme Court under control, and 
to destitute from office the Chief Jus-
tice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry 
in 2007. In the long run, the protest 
would, first, force Pervez Musharraf 
to declare a state of emergency, in No-
vember 2007, and then to allow new 
democratic elections in 2008.
Throughout  this process, the simi-
larities with the Arab democratic 
movements are evident. First of all, 
in sharp contrast to a commonplace 
about Muslim societies, in the Mid-
dle East as in Pakistan, the protests 
have seen the active participation of 
a newly active middle class. In Paki-
stan the demonstrations were domi-
nated by the lawyers (the so called 
“black suits”), while, in the course of 
the events, it embraced other profes-
sionals, businessmen, shopkeepers 
and students. The protests witnessed 
the coming at the centre of the stage 
of social forces that had previously 
been largely absent or silent in poli-
tics. Traditionally, these social strata 
in Pakistani politics would express 
themselves through the mainstream 
parties – basically, the Muslim League 
and the Pakistan People’s Party, and 
to a lesser extent the other smaller 
opposition parties or the Islamic or-
ganizations. The traditional style of 
political participation was normally 
centered on the “patron-party” sys-
tem. According to this model, the 
various social groups would try to 
defend their interests through the in-
tercession of an established political 
leader, at the provincial or national 
level. The events of 2007-8, instead, 
marked a sharp change in the political 
scene. It became clear that the middle 
classes had lost confidence not only 
in the Army-supported government, 
but also in the established opposition 
parties. They decided therefore to go-
ing directly into the streets to express 
their dissatisfaction. As said before, 
the protests were later strengthened 
by further groups as the university 
students, particularly from the west-
ern-style private colleges of the big 
cities like Lahore or Karachi. There-
fore, the demonstrations did not grow 
out of the traditional political forces. 
This fact seemed to mark an impor-
tant development in the Muslim soci-
eties. As Bertrand Badie has said, pol-
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itics in the Muslims societies seems 
to live in a “post-marxist” scenario, 
where political movements are more 
individualized and spontaneous, and 
where ideology plays a much lesser 
role than in the past.
A second important similarity be-
tween the Arab protests and the Pa-
kistani case concerns the social roots 
of these developments. As it is has 
been noticed by many observers, in 
Egypt and Tunisia and to a different 
extent in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrein, 
Yemen, the protests have been made 
possible by a demographic change 
and by the growth of the new media 
and internet networks. Both condi-
tions have created the basis for the 
protests. A very similar scenario can 
be observed in Pakistan. It must be 
said that, unlike most Middle East-
ern countries, Pakistan has inherited 
by the colonial past a tradition of al-
most-independent English-language 
newspaper. Moreover, as for Al Ara-
biya and Al Jazira televisions in the 
Arab world, Pakistan has witnessed 
in the last ten years a rapid growth of 
satellite televisions. Although gener-
ally belonging to big interests groups, 
these channels – as Aaj, Dawn, Indus – 
have created an autonomous arena of 
news communications, free from gov-
ernmental interference. At the same 
time, it must be stressed that, as for 
the MENA region, Pakistan has been 
part of the so-called “demographic 
revolution”. According to recent esti-
mates, the population under 15 years 
of age constitute slightly less than 
40% of  the total population. Another 
very important element is the crisis in 
consensus of the main Islamists par-
ties. In fact, neither in the Arab states 
nor in Pakistan the protesters have 
chosen to be represented by the main-
stream Islamist organizations, be it 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or, 
in Pakistan, the Jama’at-i-Islami or the 
other religious parties representatives 
of the ‘ulama. Although these parties 
were obviously part of the anti-Mush-
arraf front since the US and NATO 
actions in Afghanistan in 2002, these 
same parties, as their more “secular” 
counterparts, have been taken by sur-
prise and marginalized by the pro-
tests. There are obviously limits to the 
similarities between the two regions. 
We should consider that, after the dis-
missal of the Musharraf government, 
the 2008 elections have seen a come-
back of the Pakistan People’s Party in 
power. Therefore, although success-
ful in ousting Musharraf from power, 
and in forcing the Army to go back to 
the barracks, the pace of change has 
apparently been interrupted in Paki-
stan. On the other side, in the Arab 
countries is too early to assess the 
overall effect of the democratization 
movement. Nevertheless, the analo-
gies between the Arab revolts and the 
Pakistani one seem to be relevant, and 
to be worth of deeper analysis. 
Pakistani on a friday morning. Photo courtesy of 
Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
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FOR THE 2013
ELECTIONS? 
WHAT SCENARIO
If the government  led by President 
Zardari’s  Pakistan People’s Party 
accomplishes its five years duration, 
new general elections are due to be held 
in 2013, and it would be the first time 
in Pakistan since 1977 a government 
elected democratically terminates 
its mandate with no intervention 
of military coup. The Election 
Towards 2013 elections
Pakistan North Mountains series. Photo courtesy 
of Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
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Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is 
the main electoral executive  figure. 
The ECP  is accountable for holding 
elections to the local governments , 
the national assembly and  the four 
provincial ones. The Commission 
though has often connived with 
bureaucrats and manipulated polls. 
For instance when General Pervez 
Musharraf ruled the country,  the 
chief election commissioner (CEC) 
would be personally selected by the 
president. The CEC has witnessed? 
rigging in general and local 
government elections and presidential 
referendum.   Thus during the eight 
years of his rule, Musharraf modeled 
the political system in favor of the 
military, its civilian allies and the 
Islamist parties. 
This has resulted in today, as 
yesterday, ECP rather hampered 
autonomy, capacity and neutrality; 
traits to be added to the commission 
inadequate resources,  poorly trained 
staff, to the point that even high level 
positions are occupied by regular 
civil servants and bureaucrats who do 
not benefit from training programs or 
perspectives of promotion. 
Besides, the commission does not 
have any program to evaluate past 
exercises and has suffered from 
political and constitutional reforms 
made up to empower the military 
and parliaments elected through 
manipulated polls. Additionally 
election tribunals fail to solve post 
election controversies as they are 
stuck with delays and corruption and 
still a number of discriminating laws 
remain in place such as the those (list 
laws) that outline eligibility criteria 
based on religion for the electoral 
candidates. In such conditions 
the organization has proven to be 
ineffective, with its regulations 
ignored by politicians, military and by 
its own officials. The ECP’s shortage 
of liability, efficiency and autonomy 
has harshly restricted its faculty to 
supervise trustworthy elections and a 
neat political transition.
 A democratic transition is currently 
ongoing in the country though it is 
still a weak process, especially since 
2008 national polls were known to 
have been  widely manipulated. 
Elections have been historically 
gerrymandered in Pakistan and such 
a practice have deteriorated trust 
in electoral institutions, inflamed 
domestic violence and strengthened 
authoritarian power. Another flawed 
election may be expected at the 
hand of the military and civilian 
administration, which would 
destabilize even more an already 
fragile state. 
The democratic transition is only 
likely to last if the electoral laws and 
institutions will manage to supervise 
reliable voting and guarantee a serene 
shift of power to the new elected 
government. So far consecutive 
military governments have been 
ensuring the perpetration of their 
regimes both rigging the polls at 
national, provincial and local level, 
and conniving respectively with 
the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) 
and the Pakistan People Party (PPP). 
Nevertheless it is interesting to notice 
that earlier last year the parliament 
has modified the constitution 
(amendment 18th)  abrogating 
the bend introduced by Gen. 
Musharraf.  The package consolidates 
parliamentary democracy and makes 
the appointment of the top officials 
of the ECP clear and subordinate to 
the supervision of the parliament.  In 
fact a joint parliamentary committee 
including members of government 
and opposition are to finally confirm 
members and CEC of the ECP 
designated in the National Assembly 
in consultation between the leader of 
the opposition and prime minister. 
Only a month later (a month later than 
what?), in May 2010,, the ECP, assisted 
by the international community, 
drafted a 5-year plan comprising 
fifteen electoral reform objectives and 
one hundred twenty nine specific 
sub-goals, giving directions for  a 
number of issues;  including human 
rights policy,  voter registration, 
and election dispute mechanisms. 
And if those few progresses are 
encouraging, the words of leader of 
PML opposition party, Nawaz Sharif 
are even more, as he has often been 
expressing his support for a transition 
towards democracy and against any 
unconstitutional instruments. 
Similar claims though need facts and 
consistent actions to follow. Equally 
the population census planned for 
autumn 2011  - the last exercise were 
conducted for the national elections 
of 2002 and for the local ones of 2005, 
both under Gen. Musharraf and both 
affected with gerrymandering -  in 
view of the 2013 general election, 
needs to be carried out free of flaw 
and rigging in order not to threaten 
a transition to civilian government 
and to ward off the risk of brutal 
ethnic conflict especially in Karachi, 
the financial heart of Pakistan. 
Aggravated ethnic, political and 
sectarian violence in the city is in fact 
exacerbating yet delicate relationship 
between PPP (with Sindhi majority) 
and Muttahida Qaumi Party (MQM 
with Mohajir majority). 
A twisted electoral process could 
cause street riots and in any case 
increase the violent conflicts between 
MQM, PPP and the Awami National 
Party (with a Pashtun majority) in 
Karachi and in the rest of the country. 
Dysfunctional government and state 
structure are in fact considered one of 
the main  agent for the spread of ethnic 
violence and the rise of militant Islam 
that never stopped in the country. 
Ascending militant Islam. 
As stabilization in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) is 
problematical due to the delays of the 
government in the implementation 
of political and economic reforms, 
the Taliban groups took control over 
the region.  Military operations in 
FATA have been unsuccessful and 
law and state institutions are still 
a colonial heritage that keep the 
region segregated from the rest of 
the country, withholding political 
rights and economic opportunities 
to the population. The feeling of 
frustration that rises especially 
amongst young people for the lack 
of proper education, health care and 
economic growth makes the religion 
more appealing.  15,000 out of 20,000 
madrassas in Pakistan support 
intransigent doctrines.  During the 
years of the Afghan conflict, external 
capital has funded extremists and 
supplied weapons to Pakistan. 
Today’s Al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban 
are a result of the Saudi and American 
bolster to the Afghan anti-Soviet 
mujahedin during the 1980s, and to 
the Saudi support to radical Islam 
against the Pakistani Sufism. 
One of the consequences of such arising 
of Islamic fundamentalism with 
violent means is the consolidation of 
the “Punjabi Taliban” group. Punjab is 
the most populated region of Pakistan 
20
www.itpcm.sssup.it
ISSN. 2239-7949July 2011ITPCM International Commentary
with three-fifth of the population 
living  there. The south is particularly 
flourishing of Saudi-funded religious 
institutions. The Punjabi Taliban are a 
wide grouping of radical movements, 
many coming from collaborations 
with the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) in the Kashmiri conflict. The 
movement is a mixture of ISI backing 
against Indian militants, Arabian Gulf 
support in south Punjab and anti-Shia 
inclination in central Punjab. 
Military and political leaders 
themselves have called on Islam as 
a fount of stoutness. The military 
dictator mandatory?  for the murder 
of former prime minister and 
president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, boosted 
orthodox Muslims in the bureaucracy 
and military, backed Islamist parties 
and introduced sharia law.
Both the assassinations of the 
minorities minister Shabbaz Bhatti on 
March 2nd and of governor of Punjab 
Salman Taseer on January 4th were 
claimed by Punjabi Taliban. 
According to Amir Rana of the 
Pak Institute for Peace Studies, the 
terrorist organization is divided in 
three main branches. Punjabi Taliban 
who provide foot soldiers. “Pushtun 
Taliban” who provide logistics to 
contrast American battle against 
Pushtun Taliban of Afghanistan. Al 
Qaida that provides the ideology. 
Pakistani military conceded the 
Pushtun Taliban network to develop 
as long as they were supporting ISI 
allies Afghan Taliban. Soon though, in 
2009, under U.S. pressure, they had to 
force them out of South Waziristan and 
Swat Valley into North Waziristan. 
ISI is held accountable for nearly 
everything including the murder of 
Benazir Bhutto and the radical chat 
show on TV. Though it is interesting 
to mention that quite a credence is 
given to a complot theory. A former 
ISI head recently referred to Shabhaz 
Bhatti killing as an episode similar 
to “Raymond Davis case” – the CIA 
security officer who murdered two 
Pakistani citizens in the street of 
Lahore. According to the retired ISI 
official in fact, the episode is part of 
an American intelligence tactic aimed 
at destabilizing Pakistan to prove 
somehow that the country’s nuclear 
weapons are not safe in Pakistani 
hands.  
Pakistan has still the world’s fastest 
growing nuclear arsenal and this is 
likely to remain a concern for the 
international community for a long 
time.  
Pakistan North Mountains series. Photo courtesy 
of Saeed Ur Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
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by Murat Yucer
Consultant, UNHCR Islamabad
HUMAN RIGHTS 
ISSUES IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan has essentially been featur-
ing as an integral part of the theatre 
for military and intelligence opera-
tions focussed both within Pakistan 
and Afghanistan since Soviet times 
and subsequently during the “War on 
Terror” era until today. It has suffered 
two major natural disasters since 2005 
while escalated conflict between mili-
Overview
Children in Lahore. Photo courtesy of 
Rahat Dar, Pakistan, 2010
"The information presented and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the views of the United Nations, Agencies or partners"
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tants, government and international 
forces persists on Pakistani soil – all 
of which exacerbate the human rights 
situation. 
According to World Bank/Asian De-
velopment Bank report (Damage 
Needs Assessment 2010) last year’s 
flood alone lead to an estimated 
recovery and reconstruction cost 
amounting to between US$ 8.7-10.8 
Billion1, in areas which were already 
acutely under-developed and lacking 
in basic services.
As history has proved time and again, 
ultimately it is the civilian population 
that has borne the brunt and the cost 
of the geo-political landscape with all 
of its negative ramifications on the 
human rights situation in the country. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of appro-
priate legislation or policy concerning 
the internally displaced and the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan is not signatory 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention2; in 
addition the existence of problem-
atic laws (i.e. Blasphemy Laws as re-
flected in Pakistan Penal Code) also 
continue to pose challenges for the 
advancement of fundamental rights 
and freedoms in Pakistan.
Refugees
While European countries have ex-
pressed great concern with the influx 
of refugees/migrants from North Af-
rica in the wake of civil unrest and 
conflict – war and civil strife in neigh-
bouring Afghanistan has resulted in 
about 1.7 million registered Afghans 
in Pakistan as of 2011 - hosted for de-
cades in the country.3 
According to preliminary data from a 
UNHCR pilot vulnerability survey of 
the refugee population, tens of thou-
sands of these refugees suffer from 
critical medical condition (including 
HIV, AIDS etc), mental disability and 
severe physical disability. Thousands 
more are being periodically detained 
(notably with respect to the 14 For-
1 Pakistan Floods 2010, Preliminary Damage 
Needs Assessment, November, 2010, Prepared 
by Asian Development Bank and World Bank
2 http://tribune.com.pk/story/202214/signing-
the-refugee-convention/
3 http://tribune.com.pk/story/202214/signing-
the-refugee-convention/
eigners Act) and/or deported with 
a wide range of refugee women re-
maining at risk of violence & honor 
killing or who are survivors of sexual 
and gender-based violence (GBV). 
Pakistan shares 2200 KM border with 
Afghanistan and Torkham is the offi  -
cial Entry/Exit Point between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan in K.Pukhtunkhwa, 
where thousands of Afghans and 
Pakistanis cross the official Exit/Entry 
point on daily basis both legally and 
illegally (mostly illegally). Many of 
the detention and deportation cases 
take place at this area.
In sum, the continuing protection 
issues faced by Afghan refugees in-
clude the following, bearing in mind 
that the Government of Pakistan is 
still not signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention:
•	 Legal protection : lack of doc-
umentation; arbitrary arrest, harass-
ment, detention, risk of deportation; 
freedom of movement; push factors 
for induced return (e.g. camp closure/
relocation without viable alternatives)
•	 Physical protection – e.g. 
Gender-Based Violence (GBV), civil-
ian character of asylum.
•	 Social protection – e.g. needs 
of Extremely Vulnerable Individuals, 
lack of response mechanisms, access 
to services, health, education etc.
Internal Displacement
Apart from the protracted Afghan 
refugee population, hundreds of 
thousands of Pakistani families have 
been displaced as a result of conflict 
within Pakistan, particularly from the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) notably Mohmand,  Bajaur, 
Orakzai, Kurram, North and South 
Waziristan and FR Tank. In addition 
last year’s flood affected 20 million 
people and approximately 1.7 million 
homes were either partially or totally 
destroyed.4
The ongoing military operations in the 
places of origin may have increased 
the rate of human rights violation 
(Physical rights, legal rights, safety & 
4  Source for NDMA data: http://www.paki-
stanfloods.pk/response/gender-a-child-cell/
press-release
security) which pose protection risks 
to the civilian population. Due to the 
involvement of some Internally Dis-
placed Persons (IDPs) in the conflicts, 
there are repercussions on the safety 
& security in the camps leading to ar-
rests & detentions of IDPs. This opera-
tion in the camps has negative impact 
on the overall situation/welfare of the 
IDPs. Some of the parties involved in 
the conflict are not respecting national 
and international human rights laws 
and are committing violations of such 
laws and standards (i.e. kidnapping, 
execution in public, killing, bombing 
of civilian infrastructure etc.).
It is probable that the population will 
be at continued risk of gender-based 
violence. Women and girls are most 
vulnerable groups in harmful tra-
ditional practices such as early mar-
riages, forced marriages, restriction 
on female education, restrictions on 
females, “swara” (where crime com-
mitted by male is compensated by 
giving a female in compensations) etc. 
Cultural taboos will likely continue to 
restrict reporting of GBV-related is-
sues.
However, The FATA area remains un-
der a special legislative regime (Fron-
tier Crimes Regulations Law) which 
is dominated by tribal laws and jirga 
justice - which calls for a specific pro-
tection strategy and a different modus 
operandi; limiting sometimes the pos-
sibility of humanitarian agencies to 
provide assistance to returning popu-
lations. In addition as mentioned ear-
lier there currently lacks national IDP 
policy and registration that would 
facilitate human rights protection for 
IDPs.
Blasphemy Law
The blasphemy law has been in 
place since the Colonial era but only 
a limited number of cases resulted 
in convictions during that time.5 
However, after religious scholars and 
clerics increasingly influenced policy 
making during General Zia’s rule, a 
new set of stricter blasphemy laws 
were passed, after which the number 
of cases escalated. The definition of 
the term blasphemy proves vague, yet 
5 http://jinnah-institute.org/events/196-the-cur-
rent-blasphemy-law-is-mis-used-for-injustice-
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it carries a mandatory death sentence 
under section 295C of the Pakistan 
Penal Code, which forbids defaming 
the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Tri-
als concerning charges under § 295-C 
must take place in a Court of Session 
with a Muslim judge presiding.
Several other sections of Pakistan’s 
Criminal Code also comprise its blas-
phemy laws. § 295 forbids damaging 
or defiling a place of worship or a 
sacred object. § 295-A forbids outrag-
ing religious feelings. § 295-B forbids 
defiling the Quran. Except for § 295-
C, the provisions of § 295 require that 
an offence be a consequence of the 
accused’s intent. Defiling the Quran 
merits imprisonment for life.6 
6 http://pkpolitics.com/discuss/topic/history-
of-blasphemy-law-in-pakistan
The topic has been focus of much 
heated debate given that between 
1988 and 2005, Pakistani authorities 
charged 647 people with offences 
under the blasphemy laws.7 Fifty 
percent of the people charged were 
non-Muslim. Twenty of those charged 
were murdered soon after the charge 
was laid. Concerns about the contin-
ued implications of the law, especial-
ly on minorities have been taken up 
both nationally and internationally. 
The main concerns expressed have 
been that these laws are used as a 
tool to intimidate, harass, repress and 
persecute minorities or to settle per-
sonal enmities. The debate has been 
so heated to the extent that Salman 
Taseer, former Governor of Punjab 
was assassinated by his own body-
7 http://www.waqarhussain.net/blog/2010/11/
blasphemy-law-in-pakistan/
guards in January this year for speak-
ing out in defence of Asia Bibi - who 
was sentenced to death by hanging on 
a charge of blasphemy in November 
2010. The former Federal Minister of 
Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti was 
killed as a result of his vocal call for 
reform of the legislation. The Pakistan 
Taliban claimed responsibility for that 
killing. 
However despite such developments 
and various efforts by civil society, 
human rights activists and govern-
ment officials to reform or repeal the 
laws, no change has yet been achieved 
and many assumingly remain in fear 
of consequences for any slip of the 
tongue.
Mosque and Shell. Photo courtesy of Saeed Ur 
Rehman, Pakistan, 2011.
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